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Introduction
Can rule-based intergovernmental transfers be manipulated to buy political support for an incumbent politician? Political economy literature posits that incumbent politicians, who may be opportunistic, implement policies aimed at maximizing their chances of re-election. Most empirical studies (Stromberg, 2004; Larcinese et al., 2013; De La O, 2013; Bracco et al., 2015; Dasgupta, 2015) that have tested this assumption, generally focused on the discretionary component of public spending and targeted transfers, but not rule-based intergovernmental transfers. These transfers are more likely to be subject to manipulation, especially in countries with weak institutions and a dominant party framework in which incumbent party leaders decide "who gets what, when and how." Surprisingly, the literature on tactical redistribution in developing countries (with the exception of Arulampalam, et al. 2009 and Banful, 2011) focused mainly on ethnic favouritism without much attention to the political motives behind the use of redistributive politics. The democratization wave experienced in Africa over the last two decades (Rakner et al., 2008) , together with the push for further decentralization reforms (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2004) , call for paying more attention to transfer manipulation for political reasons. Furthermore, analysing the effect of opportunistic fiscal transfers on the electoral fortune of incumbent politicians can be difficult due to problems of endogeneity of grants to electoral variables. While few studies (e.g. Dahlberg et al., 2008; Litschig and Morrison, 2013) have attempted to mitigate this problem using quasi-experimental designs, others simply assume that political competition at the sub-national level is exogenous to the use of transfers or unobserved determinants of transfers.
In this paper we propose to test the plausible nature of that assumption and more precisely to assess whether a rule-based intergovernmental transfer scheme in Nigeria was manipulated to win more votes. To that purpose, we exploit oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political discretion the central government can exert in rule-based transfers. In so doing, our paper contributes to the literature on tactical redistribution in developing countries, and also sheds light on how large increases in natural resource rents increase political power and the ability to buy votes (Robinson et al., 2014) .
Nigeria is an interesting case to consider for several reasons. First, its high dependence on oil rev-enues and the fact that part of these revenues is distributed in a proportional way to the oil-producing states allow us to exploit exogenous variation in crude oil prices as an instrumental variable, in order to estimate the impact of transfers on incumbent electoral fortune. Indeed, oil prices can be considered as exogenous to within Nigeria, since the country accounts for less than 4% of world oil production (Abidoye and Cali, 2015) . Second, although Nigeria has a dominant party framework, electoral outcomes vary greatly across states. This variation can be exploited to identify its effect on intergovernmental transfers. Lastly, while states implement their own budgets independently of the central government, they do not have control over the tax base or tax rate in their jurisdiction. This means that, the states' main sources of revenue are almost entirely derived from the central government transfers. Indeed, based on the Central Bank of Nigeria 2014 Annual Economic Report, the states' own internally generated revenue typically amounts to less than twenty per cent of their total revenue. Thus, it is intuitive to examine whether an incumbent government can use the centralized intergovernmental transfer system to purchase political support.
Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 for the 36 states in Nigeria, we find that an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls, improve the electoral fortune of the incumbent President. This result is robust to alternative specifications (e.g. changing the number of oil-producing states, changes in dependent variable and the variable of interest, respectively). Our results question the role of rule-based transfers as an efficient institutional arrangement in resourceabundant countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the current state of the literature. Section 3 provides the institutional background of the study. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 focuses on empirical model and results, while the last section concludes the paper.
Literature Review
The notion that incumbent politicians may benefit electorally by strategically allocating transfers to favour recipient groups is given formal expression in tactical redistributive models. Extant models (e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1996) focus on how transfers shift votes, and hence political agents target transfers where more votes are shifted. However, a continuing debate exists on the direction in which votes may be shifted: Cox and McCubbins (1986) 's core support hypothesis on one hand, and Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) as well as Dixit and Londregan (1996) 's swing voter's model, on the other. To the core-support theorists, a risk averse politician allocates funds to municipalities that are clearly attached to the incumbent party in order to maximize the return to votes and reward loyalty., while the swing voter model posit that grants are allocated to regions with high proportion of non-ideological voters. In these two models, political parties are modelled as two spatially organized groups that allocate resources across group of voters with a single electoral district. The voters in turn are assumed to have fixed and exogenous political preferences and also receive utility from the allocations they receive. Within this context, a voter is usually modelled to prefer a party that offers her a transfer, large enough to outweigh her ideological attachment to her own party (Arulampalam et al., 2009 ). This latter theoretical postulation has some interesting implications. First, votes can be "purchased" with transfers, as voters (irrespective of their ideological leanings) can be materially induced to a rival party if the price is right. Second, political parties interested in maximizing returns to votes engage in opportunistic policies and strategies aimed at winning moderate or non-ideological voters because they can be easily bought more cheaply than voters who are clearly attached to a political party (Golden and Min, 2013) .
Most empirical studies have drawn on the two models to investigate tactical redistributive policies.
Given the broad category of studies on this subject, we review briefly the most relevant one for our paper.
1 There are several empirical literatures that have examined whether beneficiary households of conditional cash transfers program tend to reward incumbent politicians (or their parties) in the next election period. For example, Ortega and Penfold-Becerra (2008) analyse differential electoral returns to excludable and non-excludable allocations in Venezuela. They find that only excludable allocations generate more votes for incumbents, and these returns are larger when electoral competition is tight.
For Uruguay, induces a substantial increase in incumbent's vote share in the 2000 presidential elections. Similarly, Zucco (2013) shows that the conditional cash-transfers program implemented in Brazil was largely responsible for the increase in electoral support among rural voters for the President. Likewise, Dasgupta (2015) demonstrates that India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act improves electoral performance of the national ruling party in state elections, but not local pro-incumbent voting. However, a few studies have reported that voters do in-fact penalize opportunistic manipulation of transfers. Kraemer (1997) shows that, in Latin America and Caribbean, manipulating fiscal cycles in pre-electoral years did not significantly increase the success rate of reelection bid of the incumbent. Also, Brender and Drazen (2008) demonstrate that election-year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is re-elected in countries with stronger democracies and institutions.
One central theme from the empirical evidence is that the patterns of distribution, and the effects of tactical redistributive policies on electoral outcomes vary across countries. The underlying assumptions for each of these studies are that incumbent politicians engage in clientelism and pork-barrel politics, and that tactical redistribution of transfers is more likely when politicians can exert some degree of discretion in the allocation of resources to favour recipient groups identifiable by partisan leanings, race or ethnicity.
2 Indeed, studies such as Levitt and Snyder (1997) ; Keefer and Khemani (2009); Veiga and Veiga (2013), and Stratmann (2013) report that pork-barrel spending confers an electoral advantage on incumbent politicians and their party. However, an important question that remain unanswered in the extant studies is, whether an opportunistic incumbent politician can manipulate a centralized rule-based transfer system to win more votes. One would expect that such transfers are more likely to be subject to manipulability, especially in countries with weak institutional settings and clientelistic framework in which incumbent local politicians can influence who win elections in their localities. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by analyzing how a centralized rule-based transfer system in Nigeria was manipulated to buy political support.
Moreover, two major issues seem to matter in determining the effectiveness of distributive politics in swaying votes for incumbent politicians or support for one hypothesis versus the others. First is the problem of matching the levels of data available and the key concepts of swing and core voters.
2 Prominent studies on ethnic favouritism can be found in Hodler and Raschky (2014), and Burgess et al. (2015) .
For many studies, available data are aggregated at the level of electoral units rather than individual voters. In our study, we exploit within-state variations using a panel dataset for 36 states of Nigeria.
This allows us to control for unobserved time invariant heterogeneity at the state level. Second, some of these studies have had to contend with the problem of finding a good measure of the underlying political leanings of voters within their geographic units. While most have relied on proxy variables constructed from voting data or election outcomes, such measures have serious implications in terms of validity and endogeneity. This is because within models of redistributive politics, voting decisions are inherently endogenous to the distribution of government grants (Larcinese, et al 2013) .
To mitigate this problem, a common empirical approach in previous studies was to implement a quasi-experimental design in which voters' behaviour in electoral districts that receive relatively higher grants are compared with those in districts that receive lower grants. However, in the absence of a quasi-experimental setting, most studies simply assume that political competition at the subnational level is exogenous to the use of transfers or unobserved determinants of transfers. Our paper considers an instrumental variable approach to test the plausibility of this assumption. We exploit exogenous variation in oil windfalls as an instrumental variable, in order to estimate the impact of transfers on the re-election prospects of incumbent politicians. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use instrumental variables to analyse the impact of tactical redistribution on election outcomes in a sub-Saharan African country. Most studies that have analysed tactical redistribution policies focus on one half of the story and say nothing about the impact of revenue windfalls on fiscal transfers, and hence electoral outcomes. This study intends to fill this knowledge gap. 
Institutional Background

Fiscal System and Intergovernmental Transfers
The 1999 and Local governments 20.60%. The horizontal allocation formula is given as follows: equality 40%; population 30%; land mass and terrain 10%; internally generated revenue 10%, and social development such as education enrolment, health and water 10%. In practice, a large proportion of the total 20% designated for internally generated revenue and social development are usually divided equally among the States. VAT revenues are shared as follows: 50% equally to all states, 30%
proportional to population, and 20% on derivation basis (the basis of relative state contributions to VAT revenues).
It is important to note that, while substantial source of revenues accrues to the Federation Account, the state and local governments are allowed to collect for themselves a number of minor taxes such as personal income taxes, license fees, market fees. Typically, these internally generated revenues do not account for more than twenty per cent of the total consolidated revenue. A notable exception is Lagos and Rivers States, which account for 38% and 12% of total IGR generated from all states between 2010 and 2014. In addition, even though states do not generally receive transfers from the Federal budget (but from the Federation Account); they have no control over either the tax base or tax rate of the federal allocations. Hence, these revenues can be considered as intergovernmental transfers to the states and local government as opposed to their own internally generated revenue.
Moreover and reviewing from time to time the data and revenue allocation formula, respectively. 5 Regarding the data revision process, the horizontal allocation formula is updated by the commission on an annual basis to ensure conformity with changing realities, while the vertical revenue allocation formula is seldom reviewed without due consultation with major state and non-state actors across the Federation.
Given the paucity of data on social development factors and the lack of transparency in the data updating process, there is a window of opportunity for political manipulation even within the rulebased intergovernmental transfer system. One possibility would be for committee members who are politically aligned with the incumbent, to strategically fiddle with the data revision process in order to give undue advantage to the incumbent party. Indeed, given Nigeria's weak institutional setting and incentive structure in which incumbent party leaders decides who gets what, when and how, it is plausible to suspect political interference. As an example, while the act establishing the commission empowers the President to appoint persons with "unquestionable integrity" to the commission, there's little information about the criteria for such appointments and the political affiliation of the committee members. for transfers, i.e. state population, 8 primary and secondary school enrolment rates (land mass being time-constant, its role is captured through the introduction of state fixed effects).
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Given the absence of data on internally generated revenue and GDP of the states, we use nightlights intensity to proxy for states' fiscal capacity. To calculate the city intensity, night light satellite data from the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was used. The 30 arc second data (∼ 1km2 at equator), covers the period from 1992 to 2013 (Small and Elvidge, 2013) .
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One concern may be that oil-producing states have specific political characteristics that make them more likely to receive transfers and buy votes in the second-stage. We therefore control for political variables, namely alignment likely to capture the core support hypothesis, and swing variables, related to the swing voter hypothesis. 11 We construct the political variables as dummy variables. To construct these variables, we consider the fact that decisions relating to grant allocations to a state are delayed by one time-period. Thus, allocations that is due in January 31st of a financial year are made in Six different DMSP satellites, F10 to F18, resulting in time series of 33 datasets, exist in total during this time period.
The data used were the "stable lights" data, showing the lights from cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting, removing the ephemeral lights and background noises associated with the data (Small et al., 2005 politically organised groups at a particular time and location (Raleigh et al., 2010) . Lastly, similar
to Burgess et al. (2015) , we assess the importance of ethnic and religion favouritism in determining intergovernmental transfers, and political support in the second-stage. The co-ethnic and religion variables are constructed as dummy variables that take the value of one for states where at least 50%
of the population has the same ethnic affiliation and religion as the incumbent President.
In the second stage equation, we estimate the impact of transfers on electoral outcomes. Given that elections are held every four years, we consider a bootstrap method in the second stage regression, due to the small number of clusters. In this regard, standard errors are clustered at the state level using Cameron et al. (2008) 's wild bootstrap method that is robust to heteroskedasticity.
13
electoutcome s,t = γ ln( transf ers s,t ) + θ X s,t−1 + α s + γ s,t + δ t + s,t
Where electoutcome 14 12 We use this cut-off value because electoral race in Nigeria are not usually very "tight" in most states, hence by using a 10% cut-off value, we reduce the risks of having few states as swings. Additionally, we increase the cut-off value to 20% to see if this affect our results; although not reported here, the results are robust to this alternative definition.
Using a winning margin of less than or equal to 20% do not substantially alter our results.
13 Given the small number of clusters (n = 36) and the use of predicted regressors originating from our first-stage regressions, which might lead to underestimation of within-group correlation, the wild bootstrap method produce estimators that are robust to heteroskedasticity (Cameron et al., 2008) 14 See Figure 1 on the political and leadership transitions in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015.
A major identification concern is the validity of the instrumental variable. Abidoye and Cali (2015) and Fenske and Zurimendi (2015) , oil prices can be considered as exogenous since Nigeria accounts for less than 4% of world oil production. In our main results, we use the three-month lagged average price index. However, to allow for cumulative effects and changes in expectation, we check the robustness of our results to alternative price constructions: the use of 6, 9 and 12 months moving averages and the use of anomalies compared to the long-term mean value (January 1986 to December 2006).
The second condition relates to the exclusion restriction, i.e. oil price variations should not affect political variables through another channel than transfers. Given the importance of transfers in state budgets (on average 80%), there is little scope for other budgetary mechanisms. However, we may be concerned that variations in oil prices have direct effects on state-level oil production and therefore on state-level economic activities. To assess further that identification threat, we control for changes in economic activities, proxied by cumulative rainfall, temperature, and nightlights at the quarterly level. Moreover, given the possible strategic use of intergovernmental transfers for political reasons, we may be concerned that the political characteristics of states may also be correlated with omitted variables at the state level.
To reduce the problem of omitted variables, we take advantage of our unique dataset in several ways. First, we restrict the transfers variable to formula-based grants allocated by the central government to the 36 states of Nigeria. Controlling for the criteria used to allocate funds, such a restriction should limit the risk of omitted factors affecting both the dependent variable and the main variables of interest. It basically reduces the risk that omitted variables, including time-varying state-level 15 Given some discrepancies with our data on transfers, we also check the robustness of our results to assuming no oil production in Lagos and Ogun.
changes, complicate the causal identification. Second, we further introduce state fixed effects, α s , controlling for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity at the state level. For instance, the distance to the capital is likely to confound the investigated relationships. Stromberg (2004) shows, for instance, that the use of state fixed effects in his study of the New Deal in the US changes the previous support for the swing state hypothesis. We also introduce time and quarter specific dummies δ t and γ q , to account for unobserved time effects. Third, we lag our political variables to mitigate the simultaneity issue between voting behaviours and inter-governmental transfers. Said differently, our political variables (i.e. alignment and swing) are defined based on the last election. The descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest can be found in Table 1 .
Results
The first stage result is presented in Table 2 . There is a positive relationship between VAT transfers and oil windfalls. This relationship is robust across various specifications, i.e. whether we include year, state, quarterly fixed effects, state-specific time trends, and control variables. A 10% increase in oil windfalls translates into a rise in VAT transfers by about 1.99% to 2.08% (i.e. column (5) to (7) of Table 2 ). Table 3 provides the second stage results. Columns (1) to (3) report the baseline regressions without political or socio-economic controls, while columns (4) to (7) include the controls. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the VAT transfer variable provides supportive evidence that increases in VAT allocations received by a state improve election outcomes for incumbents. Specifically, the result in column 7 suggests that a 10% increase in VAT transfers increases the percentage of vote share of the incumbent President by 12.25 percent.
The 2SLS estimates radically differ from the OLS estimates presented in Appendix (Table A3) . 16 As an identification check, we experimented with other alternative instrumental variables, including the use of 6, 9
and 12 months moving averages and the use of anomalies. The coefficient on oil windfalls remains positive but provides weaker first-stage estimates in the case of the 9 and 12 months moving averages. These results are not reported, but can be made available upon request.
An explanation for such a bias towards zero would be that transfers are targeted towards swing states where electoral victory is uncertain. The coefficients of the political variables presented in Table 2 back such an explanation. Another explanation may be related to the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation of the IV estimates (Angrist and Fernández-Val, 2013) . The positive impact of transfers on incumbent votes may be driven by specific circumstances in oil-producing states, limiting the external validity of our analysis. We cannot definitely reject that possibility but simple mean comparisons do not indicate that oil-producing states are more likely to be aligned or swing states, on the contrary.
With respect to the validity of the instrumental variable, it is interesting to note that the reducedform estimation not only gives significant coefficients of interest (Table A2) , but also very similar voting responses to variation in the oil windfalls (compared to the 2SLS combined effects). That is reassuring with respect to the risk of weak instruments and the exclusion restriction (Angrist and Krueger, 2001 ). We also analyse on a shorter period how the windfalls affect oil production between 2003 and 2005. The short nature of the period is driven by data availability. Our results indicate that oil windfalls do not significantly affect oil production in the short run. We also do not find any direct effect of the oil windfalls on night-light density considered as a reasonable proxy for changes in economic activities between 2003 and 2007. 17 That is somehow supportive of the exclusion restriction.
Robustness
As a form of robustness checks, we change the definition of oil-producing states by excluding Lagos and Ogun, which are considered as off-shore oil-producing states from our analysis. Our results do not change substantially as the impact of transfers on the percentage vote shares of the incumbent remains positive and statistically significant. Specifically, Table A5 indicates that a 10% increase in VAT transfers to states improves the percentage vote shares of the incumbent by approximately 11.42 percent (column (7) of Table A5 ).
We also assess how our results differ using an alternative dependent variable, i.e. the absolute number of valid votes cast for the incumbent President in the national elections. The second stage
17 These results are not reported, but can be made available upon request.
results (Table A6 ) indicate a higher impact of VAT transfers on the electoral fortune of the incumbent.
An explanation for this may be that incumbent politicians care more about winning a simple majority rather than percentage of vote shares, and hence strategically target those states with high numbers of registered voters (Veiga and Veiga, 2013) . Also, we check the robustness of our result to changes in our variable of interest. In this instance we use the log of net transfers, which is the gross statutory allocation plus 13% derivation for oil producing states. The first stage and second stage estimates are reported in Table A7 and A8, respectively. We find a robust positive relationship between net transfers and electoral outcome, but the first stage provides a weaker instruments when controls are included.
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Furthermore, we introduce a quarter-specific effect prior to elections in order to explore the electoral dynamics of transfers. While we do find a higher effect at the quarter just before the election, the magnitude of the difference remains very small. This effect echoes Veiga and Veiga (2013) , who find that voters do reward increases in government spending in the period close to elections, but not over a full election cycle. Unfortunately, the lack of transfer data prior to 2007 does not allow us to explore further the role of political cycles in affecting the relationship between transfers and electoral support for the incumbent. Finally, as a form of falsification test, we use the gross statutory transfers that exclude the 13% derivation for oil-producing states. Given that all revenue from oil exports above the budgeted oil price are deposited in the Excess Crude Account, we do not expect oil windfalls to have any significant effect on gross transfers. Indeed, the first stage results reported in Table A9 confirm our presumption.
Conclusions
There is much discussion about what motivates intergovernmental transfers. Recent developments in theoretical and empirical literature suggest that partisan or opportunistic governments use transfers to increase their chances of re-election. Thus, to constrain political manipulation of fiscal policies, many countries like Nigeria, Brazil, Ghana, Japan have implemented a formula-based intergovernmental system based on verifiable and objective criteria. In this paper, we examine whether formula-based intergovernmental transfers can be manipulated to win more votes, using data from Nigeria. Our results suggest that increase in VAT transfers may indeed be manipulated to buy political support for the incumbent government in the national elections. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses (using wild-bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) .)
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses (using wild-bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) .)
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% All variables (except alignment and swing) are in log form * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
